What A Drunken Captain On Mitsui OSK’s Nippon Maru Means For The Mauritius Wakashio Enquiry

In December 2018, a cruise ship by one of Japan’s largest shipping companies, Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL), slammed into the side of a US Naval Base in Guam causing millions of dollars of damage.

That ship was called the Nippon Maru.

As part of the three separate enquiries conducted by the US Government, Japanese Government and a MOL investigation, several systemic issues were found to have contributed to the crash.

One particularly surprising revelation after the incident, surrounded the question of whether the captain had been over the alcohol limit or not. Even the US National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) report highlights the odd evolution of this explanation.

As a result, in 2019 MOL announced bold changes to all ships operated by the $12 billion Japanese giant. Led by the group CEO and President, Junichiro Ikeda who had himself come up through the same Passenger Liner division as the Nippon Maru, MOL declared it would roll out a comprehensive alcohol risk prevention plan. This was to ensure such an incident involving an alcohol on a MOL-operated vessel would ‘never happen again.’

18 months later, the Wakahio happened.

The cause of the Wakashio has not yet been revealed, but there have been allegations that alcohol was involved. These have not been independently verified, nor proven or revealed in court. There should have been a working alcohol breathalyzer on board the Wakashio, that the crew were trained to use under MOL’s groupwide policy. The Captain of the Wakashio has not yet commented on these allegations.

If alcohol is shown to be a factor, would this be a significant failing for MOL’s leadership given the importance and credibility MOL had placed on its alcohol risk policy in order to operate ships safely around the world? MOL’s CEO had personally championed this policy through CEO-level messages, MOL had prominently displayed the new policy as part of its 2019 Annual Report, and MOL had to specifically respond to Japan’s Minister of Transport who had demanded bold changes following the Nippon Maru crash.

MOL’s alcohol promises to the Government of Japan

MOL had received a special order from Japan’s Ministry of Transport to ensure the safety of its transport services (Article 19, Paragraph 2 of Japan’s Marine Transport Act).

As a result, MOL issued a statement on 5 April 2019  to the Minister of Transport in Japan that it would roll out a strict groupwide program to ensure ‘such an incident would never occur again.’ In a statement in its 2019 Annual Report, MOL said, “We will make concerted efforts for the ‘Development of Groupwide safety and quality management,’ which was adopted as a focus area for the current fiscal year under ‘Rolling Plan 2019’.”

Questions will now be raised about the effectiveness of MOL’s groupwide alcohol policy (which also covers vessels operated by MOL), and how serious they took the findings from the 2018 Nippon Maru crash.

The 2018 Nippon Maru crash

The Nippon Maru is MOL’s largest cruise ship. It is run by a division of MOL called MOL Passenger Lines. Cruises on board this ship are also what MOL has promised to Mauritius as part of the ‘reparations’ for the impact that the Wakashio has had on the island.

On 30 December 2018, it was visiting the US Naval Base on Guam. In a maneuver, the rear of the Nippon Maru scraped against the side of the docks. This type of collision is known as an ‘allision.’

The summary NTSB report (available here), had several observations. One of the most notable surrounded that of the captain as well as his relationship with the third officer.

In the report, NTSB says the third officer did not have a good relationship with the captain (known as the Master), but then implied he had smelt alcohol on the master’s breath only after the allision. 

In the NTSB account, it was reported that “The third officer told investigators that he had 1 year and 4 months experience as a third officer. The Nippon Maru was the only ship he had served on, and he had only worked for this master [Captain]. The third officer told investigators that his relationship with the master was ‘not good.’ He said, ‘[The master] doesn’t like my briefings. He seems annoyed with me, and [on the accident date] he said, ‘no brief; don’t report to me.’

He went on to say something peculiar straight after the crash. “The pilot stated that, as he prepared to leave the ship after the accident, he smelled alcohol on the breath of the master.  He said that prior to this time he had not been close enough to the master to detect the odor.”

So there was a poor relationship with the third officer, the allegation came from just one witness (the third officer), and the witness had only smelt the alcohol after the crash (no other witnesses were mentioned in the report smelling alcohol on the captain’s breath). The report said that the captain initially claimed to only have had one drink around 8 hours earlier (at 1pm on the day of the allision, that occurred at 9.13pm on December 30, 2018).

“During post-accident interviews, the master told investigators that he drank one can of beer about 1300 on the day of the accident and had no other alcoholic beverages before getting under way.”

However, two weeks later, the Captain changed his version of events and said to Japan’s Ministry of Transport that he had drunk one and a half cans of whiskey and soda. There was no way to fully assess which version of the truth was accurate, or why the version changed.

The report goes on to say, “In a statement made to the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism about 2 weeks after the accident, the master reported that, between 1700 and 1800 on the accident date, he drank one and a half cans of premixed whisky with soda.

He also stated in the Report of Marine Casualty submitted to the US Coast Guard that he drank a can of beer after the accident, between about 2300 and 2400, to ‘calm my mind.’”

As the breathalyzer was only conducted five hours after the incident (at 2.15am), there was no concrete proof of when the Captain would have drunk the alcoholic beverage. The timing depended on the account of only one witness - the third officer, who had already admitted a poor relationship with the Captain.

“According to the Coast Guard report of mandatory chemical testing following a serious marine incident form, the master had a positive alcohol screen at 0215 on December 31, about 5 hours after the accident, with a confirmatory positive breath alcohol test of 0.071 g/dL (grams per deciliter) at 0230.

Per the Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 95, an individual is under the influence of alcohol when operating a vessel other than a recreational vessel with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 percent by weight (equivalent to 0.04 g/dL) or more. Company policy for the Nippon Maru stated that the crew was required to abstain from drinking 4 hours before performing scheduled duties and keep alcohol levels at less than 0.03 g/dL while on duty.

The master was documented as having a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.071 g/dL approximately 5 hours after the accident, and therefore it is likely that the master consumed more alcoholic beverages than he reported. Because the breathalyzer test was conducted 5 hours after the Nippon Maru struck the D wharf, it is possible that the master’s BAC was the result of additional alcohol consumed after the accident. However, the master’s errors in maneuvering the vessel were not consistent with his level of skill and experience—in particular his experience with this vessel in this harbor—suggest that he was impaired during the vessel’s voyage. Also, the pilot noted that the master smelled of alcohol just after the accident.”

What is also notable from the Nippon Maru crash, was additional findings in the NTSB report about the design of the cruise ship’s joystick and dashboard, which led to confusion in the heat of the moment of a maneuver going out of control. MOL mentioned in its report that it would redesign the layout of the controls so such confusion would not occur again. 

In the investigation report, the NTSB reported that. “The master stated that while he and the pilot attempted to pivot the vessel in the turning basin, he had mistakenly moved the joystick that controlled the Nippon Maru’s engines and rudder to the astern position. Statements from the third officer and bridge wing VDR audio recorded during the accident sequence confirm that the master moved the joystick astern, eventually moving it to full astern, and kept it there until after the vessel struck the mooring dolphins.”

The relevant accounts can be found in the NTSB report of the incident.

MOL’s promise of a strict groupwide alcohol policy led by the President

On 5 April 2019, in response to the Nippon Maru, the head of MOL’s Passenger Division,  Naohiko Yamaguchi, issued an apology to Japan’s then Minister of Transport, Keiichi Ishii.

In a statement issued by MOL at the time, available here in Japanese (and easily translatable), MOL makes several promises.

The promises included:

• A groupwide policy that would be spearheaded by the President of MOL across all divisions. The President of MOL is 64 year old shipping veteran, Junichiro Ikeda, who has spent his entire 41 year career with MOL. He has staked MOL’s future strategy on three pillars of environmental sustainability, the adoption of new digital technologies, and strict safety compliance (such as the groupwide alcohol policy). The credibility of all three have been put in question with the Wakashio incident.
• The alcohol policy would cover all vessels operated by MOL – not just the ones that are owned by MOL. This is particularly significant for the Wakashio, which was being operated by MOL.
• New alcohol breathalyzer equipment would be installed on all vessels.
• The company’s safe operating culture (a legal document called Safety Management System which is an important requirement under UN IMO law called International Safety Management ISM Code) would be updated with new guidance on regulations, measures to prevent drunken shifts, documentation and awareness for all crew to be aware with what to do if they suspect alcohol to be a factor.
• A strict new alcohol breathalyzer policy would be put in place on board all MOL-operated vessels.
• MOL understood that the root cause of alcohol was stress and mental health, and committed to undertake regular assessments of stress and mental health of all staff and crew on board its vessels to assess potential alcohol risks.
• A regular ‘education program’ would be put in place to thoroughly disseminate drinking management regulations.
• It referenced Japan’s Maritime Transportation Act, Article 19, Paragraph 2, which talks about the special regulations set out by the Ministry. The specific  regulation it refers to says, “The Minister of Transport may provide for special regulations concerning the navigation in prescribed ports by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Transport.”

• MOL then ended their statement about the risks of alcohol, with a clear commitment that this “never again would this occur.”

With the crash of the Wakashio, and the huge devastation this has now caused to Mauritius’ coastal communities and rare wildlife, important questions must now center around how robust MOL’s alcohol policies were, and how serious MOL’s leadership took the 2019 commitments made in its Annual Report.

Questions that MOL would need to answer

1. How was this alcohol policy being monitored at a group level by MOL’s President? 

Usually, if something is so important, there would be monthly KPIs reported to the CEO and Board to reveal what % of mental health, alcohol tests had been performed, and the results of this. Given alcohol has been cited as a major cause of incidents in the Exxon Valdez (later proven false), Cosco Busan (prescription drugs), Nippon Maru, among others, monthly reporting at the CEO and Board level had to be seen as a critical risk indicator. Not to have done so would be serious, and show such promises only existed on paper. All other heavy industries that carry such risk, such as mining or oil and gas, have monthly board reporting on days lost to injury, and this is a critical KPI upon which Board and Executive salary is linked. Was this being done at MOL with alcohol-related risks, and monitoring?

2. What did these results show? 

With the coronavirus pandemic this year and seafarer organizations such as ITF and ISWAN, all highlighting mental health and fatigue on board vessels, what did MOL know about the stress of crews before sending them on some of the longest journeys in the world – longer than Vasco de Gama’s voyages – for months on end and no end in sight in terms of the end of their contracts or ability to fly home to their family?

3. Did the alcohol breathalyzers work on board the Wakashio? 

This can easily be tested (and the testing has to be conducted by an independent organization to be credible) and will form an important part of the enquiry. In addition:

• In MOL’s statement on 5 April 2019, the alcohol breathalyzers needed to be tested monthly. Where are the records that this equipment was being regularly tested on board the Wakashio?
• If they were being tested and the breathalyzers worked, why did the crew not follow MOL’s protocols and immediately start documenting alcohol consumption of important officers, as per the MOL guidance?
• In MOL’s statement on April 5 2019, MOL mentioned replacing alcohol breathalyzers with the latest models. What models were on board on the Wakashio?
• MOL’s statement on April 5 2019, highlights that all records will be preserved, and measures would be taken to prevent drunken crew members from being on duty on the voyage. Were such rigorous records being kept on the Wakashio?

4. How functional was MOL’s Safety Management System?

The culture and teamwork on board any individual ship is driven centrally, as BP had to learn the hard way following the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. BP had to be serious following Deepwater Horizon by implementing a robust new ‘risk culture change’ program to ensure such safety breaches would never occur again. In shipping, the Safety Management System (SMS), is the document that sets out the standard operating procedures to ensure a safe operating culture, following IMO ISM Laws. If the rules existed in the SMS, but were not being followed, to what extent was it risky working environment in MOL that increased the risk of alcohol on duty, or a risky culture that meant the SMS was not being followed by crews?

5. How robust was the alcohol education system?

When did the Captain and the crew of the Wakashio participate in the alcohol testing education program? How effective was this program? The MOL program mentions it would address three pillars of ‘drinking and maneuvering,’ ‘drinking and health,’ ‘addiction and short term drinking.’ All three pillars would have been highly relevant in the case of the Wakashio. MOL also says that it would offer ‘individual counseling opportunities.’  How were such opportunities being offered during Covid-19, among many well-publicized issues going on among seafarers stuck on vessels around the world? Many readers have presumably sat through passive videos that act as nothing more than a tick-box exercise for a corporation to claim to Government authorities that they have addressed a concern. In today’s corporate world, a much higher standard is expected from multinational corporations. This includes full evaluation of the effectiveness of such training including published data on feedback of the course by participants. This is foundational to any course design, and would be a serious oversight by MOL which claims to have a ‘continually improving’ work culture, yet perhaps not so when it came to addressing alcohol issues among the group?

Two alcohol-related ship disasters in 18 months for MOL?

Given that at least two major shipping incidents by MOL in the past 18 months could potentially be linked to alcohol, and the Japanese giant had publicly committed to the Japanese Minister of Transport to have addressed such risks with its statement on5 April 2019, questions will now need to be asked about how seriously the giant corporation was taking such risks to the entire group. 

The company operates 815 vessels around the world and around 6000 crew. How many of these vessels and crew now pose a risk?

MOL was contacted for this article but a company spokesperson responded on October 12, that “We have no further comments from what has been publicly announced.”